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Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions are now deployed in real-world security domains, including air travel and harbors. These applications raise some hard questions. How do we deal with the equilibrium selection problem? How is the temporal and informational structure of the game best modeled? What assumptions can we reasonably make about the utility functions of the attacker and the defender? And, last but not least, can we make all these modeling decisions in a way that allows us to scale to realistic instances? I will present our ongoing work on answering these questions.