ABSTRACT: This presentation considers the problem of allocating shares of irrigation water to different agricultural agents with singlepeaked preferences with respect to their own shares. We define two different sequential allocation rules that respect the asymmetry between the agents and maintain the properties of Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness, and we design a specific algorithm to apply these rules. The results of the empirical application of these rules for the case of an irrigated area located in the Ebro Basin (Spain) show that the designed sequential rules are able  to substantially improve the efficiency of the currently applied proportional rule in  context of severe scarcity of water and/or high administrative water prices. In a subsequent analysis we examines water governance issues related to the  implementation of these allocation rules. We analyze the extent to which the gains and losses of each user affects the implementation possibilities, and examines  conditions for building agreements with side payments that provide incentives for  the majority of agents to form part of the possible agreements.

BIO: Renan Goetz worked as an “Assistent” and “Oberassistent” at the Department of Agricultural Economics at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich. After obtaining the Habilitation in Environmental and Resource Economics from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technolgoy in Zürich he joined the Department of Economics of the Universitat de Girona, where he currently holds the position of a full professor. Research interests include the behavior of the Irish farm and food system, agricultural policy modeling, the relationships between trade, aid and food security in developing countries, and WTO trade norms and disciplines.